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Abstract
Using the machinery of Game Theory, this paper analyzes how shame and guilt
a¤ect preferences. Based on abundant psychological literature, we posit that the
preference ordering of someone who can feel shame (or guilt) must satisfy a number
of axioms and prove that it can be represented by a particular utility function.
Understanding how shame and guilt work is important to explain why people respect
social norms and exhibit prosocial behavior, many times contrary to their material
interest.
Keywords: Guilt, Inferiority Feelings, Norms, Reciprocity, Self, Shame. JEL
classication numbers: C70, C72, D63, D64, Z13.
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1 Introduction
Many social researchers -Arrow (1974), Elster (1989)- have argued that social norms are
crucial for the attainment of social order. Partly for this but due also to an increased
interest on other-regarding preferences, economists are paying a growing attention to
issues like norm enforcement and the e¤ect of norms on preferences and behavior - Becker
(1996), Conlin et al. (2003), Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), Akerlof and Kranton (2005).
In addition, emotions are also attracting much attention, as the analysis of patients with
specic brain lesions suggests that they play a key role in explaining pro-social behavior.
In particular, Damasio (1994) argues that lack of emotions results in asocial behavior
-sociopaths seem to be the extreme case in this regard.1
Guilt and shame (two examples of what social psychologists call self-conscious emo-
tions; see Tangney and Dearing, 2002) seem particularly important in explaining why
people comply with norms. Indeed social researchers like Emile Durkheim and Talcott
Parsons long ago contended that people often comply with internalized norms in order to
avoid feeling ashamed or guilty, and this line of reasoning is consistent with the experi-
mental evidence from Bosman and van Winden (2002) or the evidence from Beer et al.
(2003), which report that lesions in the orbitofrontal brain region are highly correlated
with both abnormal functioning of self-conscious emotions and inappropriate behavior -
e.g., orbitofrontal patients tend to include sexually intimate (and unasked) details when
describing past emotional experiences to strangers.
Our paper uses the standard apparatus of rational preferences and games to analyze
how guilt and shame a¤ect preferences when someone has internalized a norm. To our
knowledge, our paper is the rst to formally study this issue, something that seems impor-
tant in order to organize the available evidence and promote further theoretical research.
In this respect, and although our paper is related to recent utility models on guilt and
shame -Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) and Tadelis (2008)-, it distinguishes from them
in that they do not incorporate norms into the analysis and do not provide an axiomatic
study of the preferences.
The inuence of shame and guilt on norm compliance seems important to understand
numerous social phenomena which are di¢ cult to explain if one assumes that everybody is
selsh, like contributing to charities, cooperating with NGOs, helping strangers in distress,
abstaining from being adulterous, voting in general elections, maintaining a vegetarian
diet out of respect for animal life, paying taxes, keeping the streets clean, saving water
1Mealy (1995, p. 523) notes that sociopaths, who comprise only 3-4 percent of the male population
and less than 1 percent of the female population, are thought to account for 20 percent of the United
States prison population and between 33 percent and 80 percent of chronic criminal o¤enders.
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during droughts, avoiding free-riding at public transport, visiting cemeteries to honor
deceased family or friends, participating in demonstrations, and recycling glass and paper.
Or why should rms spend huge amounts of money in e¤orts to improve society and
safeguard the environment, guided by ideas of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR),2 if
nobody cared about that?
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces norms into a game-
theoretical analysis and illustrates the concept with several examples. In section 3 we
model the preferences of someone who has internalized a norm, and prove that any rational
preference ordering satisfying four sensible axioms can be represented by a precise utility
function. Importantly, we have shown in López-Pérez (2008) that a model based on this
utility function (and other hypotheses) can explain a large number of robust experimental
facts (including some that other models of other-regarding preferences have problems to
explain). Hence, our formal study here is also consistent with that experimental evidence
and, in particular, with the mounting evidence showing that people tend to cooperate
conditionally or reciprocally -see Fehr and Gächter (2000) for a survey. In addition, our
model here is also in line with the psychological literature on guilt and shame, which we
review in section 4 in some detail. We conclude in section 5 by discussing future lines of
research.
2 Introducing Norms in Games
This section introduces norms, which are the building block of our analysis, into a game-
theoretical framework. Given any game in extensive form, let h denote an information
set and A(h) denote the set of actions available at h.
Denition 1 A norm is a nonempty correspondence 	 : h! A(h) applying on any h.
Intuitively, a norm is an "ought" statement, that is, a rule indicating how one should
behave. More precisely, one can think of the selected actions at h as the choices com-
mended by the norm, while non-selected actions constitute deviations or transgressions.
Note also that dening a norm as a nonempty correspondence means that it always com-
mends at least one choice at any conceivable situation. This might seem too demanding
as most actual norms refer to very specic situations -the norm to wear black in funerals,
for instance, is silent about how one should behave in a wedding party, or when travelling
in the subway. Nevertheless, one can accommodate this kind of norms within our den-
2For a survey on CSR, see The Economist, January 19th 2008.
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ition by simply imposing 	(h) = A(h) when convenient -e.g., the norm to wear black in
funerals applies to weddings as well, although it does not restrict choice there at all.
We have chosen denition 1 because it is simple, general (we see no fundamental
reason to restrict the range of application of the model), and because we want to distin-
guish clearly between norms and the factors that might explain compliance with them.
Furthermore, it is in line with some classical denitions of norms, like those of Parsons
(1937) and Homans (1961).3 However, we stress that denition 1 di¤ers from some others
that appear in the literature. This is unavoidable because, as Horne (2001, 3) notes "[...]
scholars disagree about what norms are. To complicate matters, they use a variety of
terms -custom, convention, role, identity, institution, culture, and so forth- to refer to
concepts that are similar to or overlap with notions about norms. Furthermore, the word
has various meanings depending on the focus of the researcher." For instance, denition
1 diverges from an extended usage in Game Theory, which denes a norm as a behavioral
regularity or equilibrium prediction of actual play -as in Kandori (1992) or Voss (2001).
Contrary to that, our model allows that players deviate in equilibrium from a norm: The
enforcement of a norm depends on the playerspreferences (to be analyzed in the following
section) and the specic game being played. Our denition also contrasts with Posners
(1997, 365): "a rule that is neither promulgated by an o¢ cial source, such as a court or a
legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions, yet is regularly complied with".
According to our denition (which is indeed very general), a law is also a norm.
To clarify matters, we also note that much literature refers to social norms, and not
(simply) norms. In this respect, we could dene a social norm as a norm that numerous
people have internalized (see next section), a denition that is somehow similar to others
present in the literature. Thus, Elster (1989, 99) dene social norms as prescriptions
that are "(a) shared by other people and (b) partly sustained by their approval and
disapproval", and Fehr and Fishbacher (2004, 185) as "standards of behavior that are
based in widely shared beliefs about how individual group members ought to behave in
a given situation". Finally, Becker (1996, 225) apparently refer to social norms when
stating that "Norms are those common values of a group which inuence an individuals
behavior through being internalized as preferences."
Since denition 1 is very exible, it allows us to represent a large range of normative
and ethical intuitions. To illustrate this point, we will dedicate the rest of this section to
provide numerous formal examples of norms. For this, let N = f1; ::; ng denote the set of
players of the game, z denote a terminal node, and xi(z) player is material payo¤ at z.
This material payo¤ can be thought as player is monetary payment or, more generally,
3See Horne (2001) for a review of the sociological literature on norms.
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as a cardinal measure of the utility that i gets from consumption and leisure through the
history of z. Crucially, material payo¤s and utility payo¤s need not coincide, as utility
may be inuenced by norms and emotions -more on this later.
In addition, let X(h) denote the set of all material allocations x = (x1; x2; ::; xn) that
succeed information set h, and F : Rn ! R denote any continuous function. We say that
vector x 2 X(h) is an F -fairmax allocation of h if it maximizes function F over the set
X(h), whereas an action a 2 A(h) is an F -fairmax action if it points towards at least one
F -fairmax allocation of h.4
Given any function F , consider a correspondence that selects all the F -fairmax actions
of h. If we interpret function F as a social welfare function, we can view this correspon-
dence as a norm of distributive justice, as it commends to move towards a fair outcome
-i.e., an F -fairmax allocation. Of course, there exist innite such norms, as there exist
innite functions F . A prominent example, though, might be the e¢ ciency norm, which
corresponds to the following function:
F (x) =
X
i2N
xi: (1)
As another example one may cite the Maximin or Rawlsian norm, which corresponds
to function
F (x) =Minfx1; :::; xng: (2)
To illustrate how these two norms select actions, consider an agent B who has to
choose one of the following three (B, other) allocations of money payo¤s: (7, 0), (0, 10)
and (3, 3). In this simple decision problem, the e¢ ciency norm commends B to choose
(0, 10) whereas the Rawlsian norm prescribes to choose (3, 3).
These simple norms share two features. First, they are history-independent : They
implicitly state that all agents, including previous transgressors, should be equally con-
sidered at any moment. One could relax this feature by assuming that function F depends
on previous history and thus construct reciprocal norms, that is, norms whose prescrip-
tions are conditional on whether others respected the norm previously. As an illustration,
4The set X(h) might not be compact -i.e., closed and bounded- and, therefore, function F might not
have a maximum on X(h). But this does not seem to pose a big problem. First, having an unbounded set
X(h) appears very unlikely in real world problems. Second, in case X(h) is bounded but not closed, one
may dene an F fairmax allocation of h by means of the following procedure. First, nd the smallest
closed set containing X(h). Second, nd the element(s) of that set that maximize F . Third, choose
a positive number " and consider a closed "-disk with center any of the previous elements. Then, any
vector(s) in X(h) within such "-disk is dened as an F allocation of h. In what follows, however, we
will ignore these subtleties and assume that X(h) is always compact.
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consider a reciprocal-e¢ ciency norm commending to choose an F [R(t)]-fairmax action at
any decision node t of a perfect information game,5 where
F [R(t)] =
X
i2R(t)
xi (3)
and R(t) is the set of players that respected the norm in the history of t. To apply this
norm, we posit that R(t0) = N at the initial decision node t0. Consequently, this norm
selects at t0 the same actions as the e¢ ciency norm (1). If t1 is a node immediately
succeeding t0 and the action leading from t0 to t1 is selected by the norm, it follows that
R(t1) = N and hence the norm selects again the same choices at t1 as norm (1). In
contrast, if node t succeeds t0 but the action leading from t0 to t is not selected by
the norm, R(t) then contains all players except the rst mover (since he deviated when
moving from t0 to t). One may proceed in an analogous way to describe set R() for
the remaining decision nodes, and then apply function (3) to determine what actions
are selected by the norm at each node. Intuitively, this norm commends to maximize
at any moment the sum of material payo¤s of all players who previously respected the
norm. Alternative reciprocal norms -like a reciprocal Rawlsian norm- may be obtained in
a similar fashion.
T2T1
P P3P2P1
1 2 3
T3
5
5
5
0
2
5
7
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3
Figure 1: A Three-Players Game.
To show the di¤erences between the e¢ ciency norm of function (1) and its reciprocal
version -function (3)- consider the three-player game tree depicted at Figure 1, which
displays only money payo¤s. In this sequential game, each player may pass (P ) the turn
to the following player (if any) or terminate the game (T ). Both norms suggest player 1
to choose T1 in order to maximize the social surplus. If player 1 deviates and chooses P1;
in contrast, the e¢ ciency norm commends to move towards allocation (7, 4, 2) and hence
choose P2, while its reciprocal version suggests to choose T2 -notice that R(t) is then equal
5We later suggest how to extend these ideas to imperfect information games.
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to f2; 3g. Finally, the e¢ ciency norm commends to play T3 if player 2 moved P2 while
the reciprocal norm suggests in this case to move P3. In other words, the e¢ ciency norm
and its reciprocal version respond in di¤erent ways to a previous violation of what they
prescribe. The e¢ ciency norm asserts that all agents, including previous transgressors,
are on the same footing and should enter equally into ones ethical calculations at any
moment. The reciprocal version, on the opposite, only considers non-transgressors as
deserving good treatment.
The idea of reciprocity is closely linked to that of retributive justice, that indicates
how transgressors should be punished. While the reciprocal e¢ ciency norm of function
(3) recommends not to be kind towards transgressors, one might think of more severe
norms commending to punish transgressors, maybe within some limits. Consider, for
instance, the following case
F =
X
i2R(t)
xi   (max
j =2R(t)
xj   min
i2R(t)
xi):
This norm commends to punish the best-o¤ deviator although the amount of the
sanction is bounded: The deviator should never end up poorer than the worst-o¤ norm
follower. One may think of related examples, like Lex Talionis (an eye for an eye and
a tooth for a tooth) and the associated idea, usual in penal law, that the punishment
should be proportionate to the o¤ence.
A second feature characterizing the e¢ ciency and maximin norms -functions (1) and
(2)- is that they are non-consequentialistic, that is, they prescribe actions without taking
into account their expected material e¤ects. To understand this point, consider a two-
player sequential game where both the rst and the second mover have available two
choices (one consistent with the e¢ ciency norm, the other not), and suppose that the
rst mover knows for sure that, if she complies, the second mover will then deviate, -in
other words, she knows that a fairmax outcome will not be reached if she complies. Even
in that case, the e¢ ciency norm extols her to respect it (an analogous argument can
be made with respect to the maximin norm). In this sense, these norms have arguably
a striking similarity with Kants Categorical Imperative -i.e., Act only on that maxim
through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law-,
which is strongly non-consequentialistic.
The e¢ ciency and maximin norms are non-consequentialistic because their prescrip-
tions at any information set do not depend on how other players are expected to play.6
6Arguably, beliefs about future behavior are not the only important ones. In games of imperfect
information, where players may not know exactly what other players (including Nature) did before,
beliefs about past behavior might be also important for players to infer the consequences of their actions.
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One way to relax non-consequentialism is assuming that the mover at h has probabilistic
beliefs about future play so that any action a 2 A(h) induces a lottery L(a) over the set
of material outcomes X(h). In this setting, and given any function F representing the
playersexpected social welfare (like, say, the expected social surplus), one could dene
an F -fairmax lottery at h as any lottery maximizing function F over the set of lotteries
fL(a)ga2A(h) , and an F -fairmax action of h as any action a 2 A(h) inducing an F -fairmax
lottery. In this setting, therefore, an action is F -fairmax at h if it induces a lottery of
material outcomes that maximizes expected fairness, given the actors beliefs at h. 7
We could think of many other examples of norms. In particular, and although all
previous examples of norms have something to do with distributive and retributive justice
-how the social cake is shared, how much e¤ort each one should put in a task, the
punishment that a transgressor should receive, etc.-, we stress that denition 1 can be
used to formally represent qualitatively di¤erent norms, like (1) rules of etiquette -e.g.,
those indicating how the silverware should be set for dinner-, (2) norms regulating what
one should eat -e.g., Muslims are told not to eat pork, Jews to eat kosher-, (3) norms
prohibiting certain sexual practices in some societies -e.g., incest, sodomy, masturbation-,
and (4) norms regulating communication -e.g., do not lie, do not commit blasphemy, do
not use "dirty" language, etc. For examples of this kind of norms, the interested reader
may consult López-Pérez (2007), where we provide formal examples of honesty norms.
3 Aversion to Norm-Breaking: Axioms
In the previous section we formally introduced norms and provided several examples.
Here we move a step further and assume that norms can be internalized and hence shape
preferences. More precisely, we introduce four axioms on the preferences of someone who
has internalized a norm and can hence feel either guilt or shame when transgressing it.
Given any norm, let R i(z) denote the set of players other than i that respected the
norm in the history of z -i.e., chose always as commended-, and I(z) denote an indicator
that takes value 0 if player i respected the norm in the history of z and 1 if player
i deviated. Observe that these two concepts are determined by the norm, and hence
they are exogenous to the model (as the norm). Further, let r i(z) 2 [0; 1] denote the
proportion of players di¤erent than i that respected the norm in the history of z -i.e., the
cardinality of R i(z) divided by n  1. Note that a unique triple [xi(z); I(z); r i(z)] can
be assigned to each z and for any player i.
7The prescriptions of a reciprocal norm, which depend on who violated the norm in the past, might
be also conditional on beliefs about the set of previous norm respecters (see previous footnote).
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If player i has internalized a norm, we postulate that her preferences over the set
of terminal nodes of a game depend on [xi(z); I(z); r i(z)] -consequently, preferences are
dened on the Cartesian product Rf0; 1g [0; 1]. Intuitively, the term xi(z) represents
material joy while the two remaining terms correspond to the self-conscious emotions,
whose activation depends on whether one complies with the norm -the term I(z)- and
whose intensity is strongly correlated with otherscompliant behavior -term r i(z)- for
the cognitive reasons that we will mention later when studying the psychology of shame
and guilt. Assuming that the preference ordering only depends on these three terms
means, among other things, that the remorse from deviating does not depend on the
harm done unto others or, more generally, on the material consequences of ones actions.
This is admittedly unrealistic, but convenient at this stage of the analysis. Nevertheless,
we suggest in the conclusion how to extend the model in this line.
To introduce the rst axiom, consider two histories of play -i.e., two terminal nodes-
along which player i always respected the norm. In this case, we posit that player i
prefers the terminal node where his material payo¤ is higher. This is admittedly a gross
simplication: Norm followers may be also concerned wether others respected the norm as
well, since they may become angry or indignant if others deviate from the norm while they
respect it. Nevertheless, if one isolates the e¤ect of both material joy and self-conscious
emotions on human motivation from that of other emotions, this axiom seems reasonable.
Axiom 1 (MI) (Material interest) For any [a; 0; r0], [b; 0; r00] 2 R f0; 1g  [0; 1],
[a; 0; r0] %i [b; 0; r00], a > b:
One implication of axiomMI concerns passive players -i.e., players who make no choice
in the game and that consequently can never be deviators. A passive player cannot bear
responsibility for any transgression, and hence she cannot feel either guilty or ashamed of
her actual play. Given that we disregard other emotions, it follows that her most preferred
outcome is that in which she gets the largest material reward.
Our next axiom models the idea that transgressing an internalized norm triggers
painful emotions. Material payo¤s being constant, therefore, one strictly prefers to comply
with an internalized norm than not to. This implies, for instance, that a judge who nds
binding a norm of honesty and who believes defendant A to be very likely blameworthy,
would rather condemn A if the material benets of telling the truth are as large as those
of lying -i.e., declaring A innocent.
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Axiom 2 (IN) (Internalization) For any a 2 R, r0; r00 2 [0; 1],
[a; 0; r0] i [a; 1; r00]:
Note that axiom IN holds even if r = 0, that is, we assume that ceteris paribus a
player who has internalized a norm strictly prefers to respect it even if no other player
respects it. Some readers might nd this contentious, and argue that the player should
then be indi¤erent between respecting or transgressing the norm (this idea could be
easily introduced in our model). However, we will provide one argument in favor of
this hypothesis later, when discussing the psychology of guilt.
The third axiom indicates that people are able to trade o¤material interests and self-
conscious emotions. A law of demand follows from this: The larger the expected price of
obeying the norm, the less compliance there should be. Thus, the judge of our previous
example may accept to declare A innocent if she is paid a high enough bribe or if she is
credibly threatened to be killed otherwise.8 As the previous axiom, this might appear to
be a contentious axiom as well: As we explain in the next section, people are often unable
to correctly forecast their emotional responses and hence to make the kind of trade o¤
assumed here. Nonetheless, this does not pose a major problem if we understand that
what people trade o¤ with their expected material payo¤ is the emotion that they expect
to feel if they deviate from the norm. This is an important implicit assumption of the
analysis here.
Axiom 3 (TO) (Trade o¤ ) For any a 2 R and any r 2 [0; 1], there exists a 2 R such
that
[a; 1; r] i [a; 0; r]:
In axiom TO, [a; 0; r] is the remorse-free equivalent of [a; 1; r]. The di¤erence a  a
measures the minimum net material payo¤ that the player should earn to be willing to
violate the norm. The bribe to be paid to the judge to corrupt her is one example. It is
easy to prove that such net payo¤ is always strictly positive.
Lemma 1 If preferences %i are rational and satisfy axioms MI, IN, and TO, then
a  a > 0:
Proof. From axiom IN, it follows that [a; 0; r] i [a; 1; r]. Transitivity then implies
[a; 0; r] i [a; 0; r], whereas axiomMI gives nally a > a.
8Naturally, assuming that everyones dignity has a price is compatible with heterogeneity. In this
sense, a judge is unsubornable when the cost of buying her o¤ is larger than the bribers material benet
of being declared innocent.
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Our last axiom models a concern for personal status -more on this later. Intuitively,
people compare with others when they transgress a norm -for any game, we implicitly
assume that a players reference group is composed by the other n  1 players- and they
feel more badly as the proportion of norm followers increases. The judge of our example
will feel especially badly if she believes to be the only corrupt judge in the court whereas
her pain will be alleviated if she believes that most judges accept bribes.
Axiom 4 (S) (Status) If [a; 1; r] i [a; 0; r] and [b; 1; r0] i [b; 0; r0] then
r0 > r , b  b > a  a
Consider now any rational preference prole satisfying axioms 1 to 4. We now prove
that such ordering can be represented by the utility function that we assumed in López-
Pérez (2008).
Theorem 1 A rational preference ordering %i satisfying axioms MI, IN, TO, and S
admits the following functional representation
Ui[xi(z); I(z); r i(z)] = xi(z)  I(z)  (r i)
where  : [0; 1]! R+ is a strictly increasing function.
Proof. Consider any triple [a; 1; r] and its remorse-free equivalent [a; 0; r]. Lemma 1
indicates that a   a > 0, whereas axiom S implies that a   a only depends on r and,
moreover, it is strictly increasing in r. Given this, function (r) is taken to be equal to
a  a.
(Take two alternatives [a; 1; r]; [b; 1; r0] and assume rst that Ui[a; 1; r] > Ui[b; 1; r0].
Hence, a (a a) > b (b b)) a > b so that it follows from axiomMI that [a; 0; r] %i
[b; 0; r0], whereas transitivity implies then [a; 1; r] %i [b; 1; r0]. The same line of reasoning
proves for any other pair of alternatives that Ui[xi(z); I(z); r(z)] > Ui[xi(z0); I(z0); r(z0)]
implies [xi(z); I(z); r(z)] %i [xi(z0); I(z0); r(z0)].
)Take two alternatives [a; 1; r]; [b; 1; r0] and consider rst the case [a; 1; r] %i [b; 1; r0],
which implies [a; 0; r] %i [b; 0; r0]. In turn, axiom MI implies a > b ) Ui[a; 1; r] >
Ui[b; 1; r
0]. A similar argument shows that [xi(z); I(z); r(z)] %i [xi(z0); I(z0); r(z0)] implies
Ui[xi(z); I(z); r(z)] > Ui[xi(z0); I(z0); r(z0)] in the remaining cases.
We make a number of remarks on the previous result. First, note that it does not
restrict much the properties of function (r), apart of being strictly positive and increasing
on r. Indeed, axioms 1 to 4 are too weak to get a more precise utility function, and
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additional hypotheses should be introduced for this. One sensible assumption might be
strict convexity: (r0 + 1
n 1)   (r0) > (r + 1n 1)   (r) if 1 > r0 > r. This assumption
states that the intensity of a deviators pain grows at an increasing rate as the proportion
of players who respect the norm rises and that, consequently, people care relatively few
about being unprincipled if most of the others are also unprincipled. Second, observe
that the utility characterization is not unique. Clearly, any monotone transformation of
our utility function can also represent a preference ordering satisfying axioms 1 to 4, and
other utility functions might play this role as well. We do not pursue this point further,
however, as our main objective was showing that the utility model in López-Pérez (2008)
is in line with our axiomatic analysis. Indeed, the utility function posited in that model
has the structure xi(z)  I(z)  (r i).9
Finally, the previous theorem assumes that preferences are rational -i.e., complete and
transitive-, and the reader may wonder whether a preference ordering satisfying our four
axioms can at the same time be rational. To start, it is rather clear that completeness does
not contradict any of our axioms -these axioms assume that the ordering of alternatives
has certain properties, not that the ordering does not exist. With respect to transitivity, it
su¢ ces to mention one preference ordering that satises transitivity and our four axioms.
For this, consider a function that assigns number b G  r (G > 0) to any triple [b; 1; r],
and number c to any triple [c; 0; r0], and consider a complete ordering such that any triple
is strictly preferred than another one with a lower number (and indi¤erent to any triple
with the same number). Obviously, this ordering satises axiom MI. It also satises
axioms IN (this is true even if r = 0, as condition G > 0 guarantees), TO (implicitly,
di¤erence a a equals r+G for any triple [a; 1; r] and its remorse-free equivalent [a; 0; r]
in this ordering), and S. To nish, transitivity also holds because this preference ranking
is based on the ranking of the real numbers, which is indeed transitive. To sum up,
rationality is compatible with our four axioms.
4 The Psychology of Guilt and Shame
In the prior section we posited that the preferences of an agent who has internalized a norm
must satisfy four axioms. In this section we review some of the psychological literature on
9To be precise, the model in López-Pérez (2008) assumes for simplicity that (0) = 0. This assumption
is at odds with axiom IN, but could be easily relaxed and does not a¤ect our results in López-Pérez
(2008), provided that (0) is small. Additionally, López-Pérez (2008) dene r i(z) as the cardinality
of set R i(z), and not as its overall proportion, as we do here. Both assumptions lead to qualitatively
similar predictions in the games analyzed in that paper (since we focus there on two-player games) and
do not change much our analysis here. We have introduced this new specication in our model here
because we now consider that it is more empirically relevant in multiple-player games.
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shame and guilt, and argue that the intuition behind our axioms (in particular axioms IN
and S) lies in the psychology of these two emotions. Additionally, we aim to clarify the
di¤erence between guilt and shame, as we feel that this point is sometimes misunderstood
-for instance, one can frequently read that guilt is internalor privatewhile shame is
externalor public; however this view is not supported by the most recent psychological
literature.
4.1 Shame: Aspiration Levels and the Perceived Self
We start by introducing two key psychological concepts. For this, we assume that personal
traits -either bodily ones like stature, color of the eyes/hair, weight, etc., or spiritual ones
like courage, creativity, intelligence, moral integrity, wit, etc.- can be somehow measured
or evaluated. In this case, the level of (self-) aspiration for a certain trait Q is the level
of Q that one considers good enough, while ones perceived self (or simply, ones self )
with respect to Q is the level of Q that one believes to have attained, that is, the image
that one has of herself on that regard.
Needless to say, the aspiration level and the perceived self need not coincide for every
trait. Thus, someone may aspire to be slim although she is actually obese. Another person
may wish to be witty but believes to be rather dull. We posit that shame of a certain
trait is activated when there exists such a negative gap between the aspiration level and
the perceived self on that trait (conversely, a positive gap should trigger pride). Note well
that the term shamerefers here to any emotional feeling triggered by that negative gap.
This includes proper shame, but also embarrassment and low self-esteem.
This negative gaphypothesis is consistent with the psychological literature, which
often considers shame to be triggered by cognitions regarding the self (Lewis, 1971; Lewis,
1992; Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995; Tangney and Dearing, 2002). Thus, Lewis (1971, 30;
emphasis in the original) claims that The experience of shame is directly about the self,
which is the focus of evaluation. Further, evidence from questionnaires indicates that
subjects often report the desire to undo some aspect of the self when they are asked
to narrate a shame episode, thus setting into motion thoughts like "If only I werent
such-and-such kind of person" -see Tangney (1995, 117) and references therein.
Additional evidence in support of the negative gaphypothesis can be obtained by
studying how people evaluate the perceived self and the level of aspiration. Festinger
(1954) provide evidence and a theory on how the perceived self is created, noting rst
that people evaluate their own personal qualities through objective means if available
-for instance, bodily qualities like ones height or weight admit such nonfaulty evalua-
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tion. Otherwise, a person resorts to othersopinions about her personal qualities.10 For
instance, the belief that one is beautiful heavily depends on whether others believe such
thing -of course, one might weight di¤erently each persons opinions.
A possible reading of Festinger (1954) also suggests a theory on how people construct
their aspiration level. Provided that an agent can evaluate the level of trait Q of any
member of her reference group (either directly or by inference from his behavior), Festinger
suggests that the agents level of aspiration for Q depends on that information:
"Level of aspiration experiments have been performed where, after a series
of trials in which the person is unable to compare his performance with others,
there occurs a series of trials in which the person has available to him the
knowledge of how others like himself performed on each trial [...]. When the
others like himself have scores di¤erent from his own, his stated level of
aspiration(his statement of what he considers is good performance) almost
always moves close to the level of performance of others. [...] When the
reported performance of others is about equal to his own score, [...] his level
of aspiration shows little variability."11
In addition, internalized standards and norms also seem to play an important role
in determining the level of aspiration. For instance, the level of tax compliance that a
taxpayer wishes to accomplish might depend on the assessed level of overall tax evasion
-a signal of the othershonesty- but also on whether she considers taxpaying a civic duty.
As another example, a teenagers desired bodyweight might be a function of the weight
of her relatives and friends, but also of the beauty standards that the media spread.
10This raises the question of where others opinions come from. Festinger does not provide a clear
answer to this.
11Festinger (1954, 140); observe the implicit mention to the reference group (emphasis in the original).
14
Objective means
Others? opinions
about A?s Q
Others? level of Q
Internalized
standards
regarding Q
??s perceived
Q
??s level of
aspiration for
Q
(If neg.
dissonant) A?s
shame of her Q
Figure 2: The Genesis of Shame
Figure 2 summarizes the previous ideas and shows how shame is activated (arrows
indicate causality).12 To start, and since internalized norms inuence our level of aspi-
ration, a deviation from those norms is likely to make us feel ashamed (axiom IN). In
addition, the aspiration level also depends on how ones behavior (and the qualities that
this behavior signals) compares with others. For this reason, a transgression is more
likely to trigger (or intensify) shame if a signicant proportion of the others do respect
the norm.13
In other words, a sense of inferiority is likely to translate into stronger shame (axiom
S) and hence shame intensity is highly conditional on what (we believe that) others have
or do.14 This can be illustrated with several examples.15 Consider a person who regards
littering or smoking at public places as improper behavior, and compare her feelings when
she litters a park grasseld that is (i) clean or (ii) dirty; or if she smokes in a public place
12The gure suggests that the activation of shame is positively correlated with variables like social
disapproval -i.e., bad opinions from the others- and public exposure (which can provide vivid information
about othersdisapproval of our behavior). We leave the study of these variables for further research.
13Note that we used the word proportion: If a participant in an IQ test ranks 100th out of a group of
100 people, that is much worse that if he ranks 100th out of a group of 1000 people. Nevertheless, it also
seems that absolute numbers matter: A low position within a very small reference group might be less
hurtful than a low position within a big group, even if the relative position -measured, say, by the decile
one occupies- is the same in both cases. For simplicity, our model focuses on the proportione¤ect.
14Therefore, shame might be important to enlighten why relative status is key for happiness (Veblen
1934; Frank, 1985).
15By stressing how shame critically depends on others behavior, these examples hint the role that
Game Theory should play in its study.
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where (i) nobody smokes or (ii) many people smoke. It is also illustrative that many
citizens of countries where corruption and tax-evasion are widespread tend to justify their
behavior by claiming If nobody complies, why should I comply?This suggests (in line
with axiom S) that the remorse from deviating dwindles as less people respect the norm:
Bad company ruins good morals.(Bible, 1 Corinthians 15:33).
All this is consistent with the psychological literature. Thus, Lewis (1971) stress that
shame is typically associated to inferiority feelings, a sense of shrinking or of being small,
and Tangney and Dearing (2002) report much questionnaire evidence showing a strong
correlation between a sense of inferiority and shame -consult also Lewis (1992), or Lindsay-
Hartz et al. (1995). In addition, some sociobiological evidence seems to point in this
direction as well. In e¤ect, studies with primates show that dominant vervet monkeys have
larger concentrations of the neurotransmitter serotonin in their blood than nondominant
monkeys -i.e., those most likely to feel inferior- and that these di¤erences are the result,
rather than the cause, of the monkeysdominance relationships -see Frank (1985, 23-28)
for a review. The fact that inferiority feelings induce low serotonin levels is interesting
because some evidence correlates low serotonin levels with mania and depression (the
popular antidepressant Prozac probably acts by increasing the availability of serotonin),
two phenomena closely linked to shame and low self-esteem -Lewis (1971), Lewis (1992)
and Tangney and Dearing (2002).
4.2 Discriminating between Shame and Guilt
Consistent with our axiom IN, many researchers from di¤erent elds (Lewis 1971, Lewis
1992, Elster 1999, Posner and Rasmusen 1999, Tangney and Dearing 2002, Bowles and
Gintis 2003) contend that guilt is activated when one transgresses an internalized norm,
a characterization that is also similar to Freuds (in Civilization and its Discontents, guilt
constitutes the punishment that the superego imposes on the ego when the latter follows
id impulses and transgresses internalized standards).
However, we note that this transgression hypothesis is somewhat contentious. To start,
some psychologists argue that the mere existence of advantageous inequities may elicit
guilt, even if the outcome is not the result of some personal wrongdoing or, indeed, of
any personal behavior at all. The phenomenon of survivor guilt, as it is called, has been
documented in survivors of Hiroshima and the Holocaust, homosexual men who have
tested negative for the human immunodeciency virus, and people who keep their jobs
when co-workers are red, among others -see Baumeister (1994) for references. Many
times, however, it happens that although neutral observers think the opposite, survivors
believe that they could have done something to avert a fatal outcome -Elster (1999, 151).
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Hence, this apparent survivor guilt can be often rationalized and understood in the typical
framework.
Leaving aside the issue of survivor guilt, however, the transgression hypothesis faces
a more puzzling problem. As internalized norms shape (at least partially) the aspiration
level -recall Figure 2-, transgressing a norm should create a negative gap between the
aspiration level and the self, and hence guilt should be indistinguishable from shame.
Nevertheless, the inuential account by Lewis (1971, 30) notes that the main di¤erence
between shame and guilt is that In guilt, the self is not the central object of negative
evaluation but rather the thing done or undone is the focus(italics in the original). Why
is the self not heavily impaired when one feels guilty? One might think of at least three
possible reasons for this.
The rst reason might be that, contrary to shame, guilt is not linked to feelings of
inferiority so that the negative gap is minor. This could incidentally explain why, as
Lewis (1992) and Tangney and Dearing (2002) note, guilt is usually less intense than
shame, and provides a reason why axiom IN of our preference model holds even in the
case r = 0. What explains this absence of inferiority feelings when feeling guilty? On
one hand, the reference group of the transgressor might be empty, that is, she might not
compare herself with others. Needless to say, this cannot occur as a result of an intentional
e¤ort: Attempting not to think about someone is a self-defeating task. What happens
is simply that no image of the others comes to ones mind when deviating. Solitary
transgressions might constitute propitious settings for this because transgressors lack then
vivid information about the others -Baumeister et al. (1994, 251) report that people may
feel guilty for failing at dieting, neglecting their studies, failing to exercise, having drugs,
masturbating, and looking at nude pictures.16 On the other hand, a transgressor might
not feel inferior if everybody in her reference group deviates as well. As an aside, this point
suggests that the same deviating behavior may elicit either guilt or shame depending on
how others behave: A soldier that deserts from his unit in the middle of the battle will
feel ashamed if he believes that ghting is his duty and most of his comrades ght, but
she is likely to feel just guilty when everybody abandons the lines.17
The two other possible reasons why the self is not impaired in guilt could be that people
believe that they are not what they dowhen feeling guilty -that is, they think that their
actions do not signal anything about their respective selves- or that they believe that the
16Taylor (1985, 88) notes that I may feel guilty because I watch that silly television serial rather than
improve my mind by reading great literature. In contrast, we might feel ashamed and not guilty if the
thought that others despise that serial and never watch it came to our mind.
17This might explain why, as Tangney and Dearing (2002, 17) report, "Our analysis of the personal
shame and guilt experiences provided by both children and adults indicate that there are very few, if any,
classicshame-inducing or guilt-inducing situations [i.e., behaviors]."
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self changes, so that the self that chose to transgress the norm is di¤erent than the self
that feels guilty later. June Tangney and her colleagues have tested these two theories -see
Tangney and Dearing (2002, 66-69) for a summary- by means of two scales respectively
assessing the belief that the self and behavior are congruent versus incongruent and the
belief that the self is xed versus malleable. 175 undergraduates were asked to complete
those scales as well as a number of other measures including one scale of proneness to
guilt. The authors report (i) no signicant correlation between proneness to guilt and
self-behavior congruence beliefs, and (ii) a negative correlation between proneness to guilt
and the belief that the self is xed. Point (i) suggests that guilt has nothing to do with
believing that people are not what they do, whereas point (ii) hints that guilt-prone
people might tend to perceive the negative gap as transient or unstable.
To illustrate this latter point, consider a young man who cheats his girlfriend for the
rst time in his life and feels very badly for that. He may nd the intensity of that pang
surprising and unexpected. In fact, he may even think that he would not have cheated
her girlfriend had he understood how badly he was going to feel, and decide as a result
not to cheat her never again.18 In this sense, the damage to the self-image is transitory:
Although he behaved badly, he believes not to be a bad person anymore -this belief, of
course, may have fragile foundations although this is unsubstantial for the argument here.
More generally, people might believe that the damage is transitory because they explain
their norm transgression as a result of a preference that has changed afterwards, maybe
because of a learning process.
That emotions are a source of preference reversals is consistent with much experimen-
tal evidence indicating that people predict rather inaccurately their future or imaginary
emotional states (recall our discussion of axiom TO). Thus, Loewenstein and Lerner
(2003, 629) report that
When people are in a coldstate -for example, not hungry, angry, sexually
aroused, and so forth- they underappreciate what it will feel like to be in a hot
state in the future and how such a state will a¤ect their behavior. They make
an analogous mistake when in a hot state and predicting how they will feel or
behave when the heat dissipates -that is, when they are in a cold state. Such
hot/cold empathy gapsoccur not only prospectively, when people predict
their own future feelings and behavior, but also retrospectively [...].
Note also that norm transgressions are sometimes the result of mistakes. Suppose, for
instance, that someone makes an inappropriate comment about other persons physical
18Incidentally, guilt is associated to some action tendencies (Frijda, 1986), like confession and reparative
behavior, that one is unable to forecast before commiting the bad deed.
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appearance without any bad intention. She might feel badly for that, but that bad feeling
may be attenuated by the belief that she has learnt not to do that again -if she has not
committed repeatedly that mistake in the past, she may be condent that next time she
will be more careful regarding what she says. Again, the transgression is only a signal of
a transient dissonance and hence the self is not impaired.
To sum up, guilt seems to be activated by ones improper behavior when, in contrast
to shame, that behavior is interpreted as signalling a transient and relatively less intense
negative gap. In turn, transience and low emotional intensity might be respectively ex-
plained by preference reversals (or because the improper behavior was the result of a
mistake) and the absence of inferiority feelings.
We nish this section by comparing the previous distinction between guilt and shame
with a classical anthropological and psychological view that understood guilt as a pri-
vate a¤air and shame as somewhat the correlate when our deviation is subject to public
exposure. Buss (1980, 159), for instance, state that The best test of guilt is whether
anyone else knows of the transgression. In true guilt, no one need know. [...] Shame is
essentially public; if no one else knows, there is no basis for shame.Many psychologists
nd this view rather inaccurate. Although there is indeed some correlation between public
exposure and shame activation (see footnote 12), evidence from questionnaires suggests
that shame is not restricted to public settings. Thus, Tangney and Dearing (2002, ch.
2) report results of narrative accounts of personal shame and guilt experiences and stress
that a substantial number of these events occurred when the person was alone and that,
importantly, solitary shame experiences were just as common as solitary guilt experiences.
Introspection is also at odds with the public-private distinction. For instance, one may
be ashamed by his own private thoughts and desires as may happen, for instance, when
thinking about ones friends husband or wife in a sexual way or when desiring someones
death. In addition, people may feel ashamed when lying or behaving unfairly, even if they
do not expect being caught. In summary, one does not need to be exposed to the others
to have low self-esteem.
5 Conclusion
Social researchers have constantly remarked that the values and norms that an individ-
ual shelters are crucial to understand her conduct and, more generally, the performance
of those societal groups that share them. Nevertheless, it is not enough to point out
that someone has certain norms to explain why she follows what they dictate; it is also
fundamental to understand the motivational forces that drive her. We believe that self-
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conscious emotions like guilt and shame are important in this regard, and have o¤ered a
formal analysis here of how they a¤ect preferences.
A series of questions deserve further study. First, our analysis here assumes for par-
simony that the pain of breaking a norm does not depend on the material consequences
of the transgressors behavior. This is indeed a simplication of the true thing: If one
person drives recklessly and an accident occurs, he will feel much more badly if someone
dies as a result.19 If the norm is a norm of distributive justice with associated function F
(see section 2), the pain might depend on the di¤erence between the social welfare F (zo)
at the optimal node zo, and that at the actual node zA.
Second, we could include additional variables that a¤ect shame and guilt -for in-
stance, Baumeister et al. (1994) emphasize social distance, that is, bad feelings may be
relatively more intense in close relationships involving relatives or friends; and Battigalli
and Dufwenberg (2007) assume that people feel the more guilty the more they disappoint
another people. Third, we argued that an unfavorable comparison with the others often
triggers shame. However, who are the others? That is, who do we compare with? We
hypothesized that people compare with those who directly interact with them -i.e., with
the set of players. This might be rather accurate in certain laboratory settings, but in
general it seems a gross simplication. As an extreme example, dead relatives might be
part of ones reference group. Fourth, research on the cognitive processes that involve the
formation of the level of aspiration and the perceived self is crucial too. Finally, a key
question is why people internalize norms. The answer, as Bowles and Gintis (2003, 20)
stress, might have to do with bounded rationality and evolution:
"The internalization of norms eliminates many of the cost/benet calcu-
lations and replaces them with simple moral and prudential guidelines for
action. Individuals who internalize norms may therefore have higher payo¤s
than those who do not, so the psychological mechanisms of internalization are
evolutionarily selected."
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